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Spoonhour: Psychosurgery and Informed Consent

PSYCHOSURGERY AND INFORMED CONSENT
JAMES M. SPOONHOURO

Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.'
Psychosurgery is a medical procedure in which brain tissue is either destroyed, removed, or cut with the intent to alter thoughts, emotions, or behavior.2 Although operations on the brain to modify behavior or personality
have a long history, 3 the more advanced forms of psychosurgery are developments of the last forty years, 4 during which time the use of psychosurgery to
control behavior has grown enormously despite periodic setbacks.5 UnderOB.A. 1968, M.A. 1970, University of Nebraska; J.D. 1974, Georgetown University.
Special thanks are due to a number of persons who provided pertinent materials otherwise difficult to obtain or who offered very informed advice and criticism. They are: Charles
R. Halpern and Helen Crowley of the Mental Health Law Project in Washington, D.C.; Dr.
Peter R. Breggin, Executive Director of the Center for the Study of Psychiatry, Inc., in
Washington, D.C.; and Stephen deMontmollin, Legislative Assistant to Congressman Don
Fuqua of Florida. The comments in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the people named above.
1. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 263 (M. Lerner ed.
1961).
2.

B.

BROWN,

L.

WVIENCKOWSKI & L.

BIVENS,

PSYCHOSURGERY:

PERSPECTIVE

ON A CURRENT

PROBLEM 1 (U.S. Dep't HEW Publication No. [HSM]73-9119) (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BROWN]. The usual definition excludes surgery dealing with organic disorders of the brain,
such as brain tumors, and most authorities agree that surgery to treat epilepsy should
similarly be excluded. Id.
3. "Trephining," an opening of the skull, was reportedly performed in Peru approximately
12,000 years ago, probably to release demons. Fourteenth century anatomy texts contained
instructions for similar operations. In 1890 a Swiss psychiatrist began removing parts of the
brain cortex to relieve patients' hallucinations and violent behavior, although he eventually
terminated the operations because of his colleagues' criticism. TIME, April 3, 1972, at 50;
Goldstein, PrefrontalLobotomy: Analysis and Warning, SCIENTIFIC AM., Feb. 1950, at 44.
4. See generally BROWN, supra note 2. The first modern psychosurgical operation was
called a "lobotomy." In neuroanatomical terminology the suffix "otomy" refers to the destruction of brain tissue or the cutting of fibers in the brain. Thus, lobotomy is the destruction of tissue in the frontal lobes of the brain or the cutting of the fibers connecting the
frontal lobes to he rest of the brain. BROWN, supra note 2, at 1. The earliest reported
lobotomies were performed in Portugal in 1935. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 44. Ironically,
Dr. Antonio de Egas Moniz, the surgeon who performed these first lobotomies and who received the 1949 Nobel Prize for his work in this area, was stopped by his own institution
after only 20 operations had been performed. Freese, Psychosurgery Is Lobotomy that Works,
SCIENCE DIGEST, March 1973, at 10, 11. Other psychosurgical procedures have included removing parts of the brain, destroying brain tissue by a variety of means, recording changes
in electrical activity within the brain, and stimulating areas of the brain with chemicals or
electrical impulses.
5. During the 1940's and 1950's lobotomists performed numerous operations in the
United States, England, Australia, and Japan as well as in other countries. The greatest
number of lobotomies were performed upon schizophrenics, in attempts to make them more
controllable. BROWN, supra note 2, at 1. The number of such operations performed in the
United States between 1936 and 1955 has been estimated at 50,000. Breggin, The Return of
Lobotomy and Psychosurgery, 118 CONG. REc. E1602, E1605 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1972); BROWN,
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standably, the procedures employed have become ever more sophisticated.6
These improved techniques have not overcome, however, the continuing
criticism of the various forms of psychosurgery, particularly the lobotomy and
its derivative operations.7 In the late 1950's and early 1960's the traditional
forms of psychosurgery fell into disrepute within the medical profession, and
the number of psychosurgical operations decreased substantially.8 This decline was hastened by the introduction of tranquilizing drugs9 and the increased acceptance of electroshock therapy as a less radical means of controlling
behavior. 10 It soon became evident, however, that not all mental conditions

supra note 2, at 1. Other estimates vary. See N. EIE, MACROSCOPICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF
TWENTY-NINE BRAINS SUBPECrED TO FRONTAL LEUKOTOmY 5 (1954) (20,000 worldwide from

1935 to 1951); Freese, supra note 4, at 12 (50,000 in the United States by the 1950's).
6. As psychosurgical experience grew, the medical procedures improved. The blind
procedure, in which the surgeon inserted a knife-like instrument through a small hole in
the skull without being certain how much brain tissue was being destroyed or severed, was
replaced by "open" lobotomies and by operations in which parts of the brain were removed
rather than just severed. ELE, supra note 5, at 5.
7. Since the first use of the technique the exaggerated claims made by the proponents
of lobotomy have been challenged. In addition, it has been asserted that the beneficial effects
of lobotomy might be outweighed by the damage done to the patient's mental abilities and
the possible "washing" of his emotional capacity. See Goldstein, supra note 3; Gould, The
Mind Surgeons, 58 NEW ScENTxsr 226, 227 (1973). One leading practitioner has since admitted that all forms of psychosurgery result in a partial destruction of the emotion regulatting connections between the midbrain and frontal lobes, resulting in a blunting of the
emotional personality. Scoville, Recent Thoughts on Psychosurgery, 33 CONN. MEDICINE 453,
456 (1969). Such criticisms apparently had little effect on the psychosurgeons, who continued to downplay the side effects of their lobotomy procedures. BROWN, supra note 2, at
1-2. Early opponents of lobotomies also criticized experimenters for interchanging results of
different surgical procedures, ignoring dissimilar diagnoses of the patients and failing to
utilize proper control groups. Scherer, Winne, Clancy & Baker, Psychological Changes During
the First Year Following Prefrontal Lobotomy, 67 PSYCHOLOGY MONOGRAPH No. 7, at 1-2
(H. Conrad ed., Whole No. 357) (1953). They also argued that follow-up studies were inadequate to substantiate experimenters' claims. Id. at 1. The cited study not only failed to
find any long-term improvement but also discovered deterioration in mental capacities in
some cases. Id. at 10-12. When the first thorough follow-up study was undertaken during the
period 1947 to 1950 the results failed to show that psychosurgery produced any substantial
long-term improvement. Mettler & Landis, Conclusions, in PSYCHOSURGICAL PROBLEMS 308,
318-20 (F. Mettler ed. 1952). One small study of lobotomy patients found that the average
postoperative life expectancy was less than two years. Em, supra note 5, at 6. Also, up to 18%
of the early lobotomy patients developed the symptoms of epilepsy after the operation although the incidence of epilepsy in lobotomized patients later decreased (Ito 12%) as the
techniques improved. Winter, Discussion, in THE SURGICAL CONTROL OF BEHAVIOR 42, 45-46
(A. Winter ed. 1971). At least one study using control groups, however, found that two years
after the operations 37% of the lobotomized patients had been discharged from the hospital
while only 2% of the control group had been released. Friedman, Moore, Ranger & Russman,
A ProgressStudy of Lobotomized and Control Patients, 108 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 16 (1951).
8. While this decline was evident in the United States and most of Europe, lobotomies
have continued to be the primary form of psychosurgery in Great Britain since 1960. Breggin,
supra note 5, at E1604.
9. Freese, supra note 4, at 12; Holden, Psychosurgery: Legitimate Therapy or Laundered
Lobotomy, 179 SCIENCE 1109 (1973).
10. Freese, supra note 4, at 12.
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could successfully be treated with drug or shock therapy." In fact, some
psychosurgeons contended that electroshock treatments were causing more
diffuse brain damage than the improved lobotomy techniques. 1' Thus, psychosurgery did not disappear's as surgeons continued to experiment with operations on different parts of the brain, hoping to minimize the major alterations
4
in personality while achieving the desired change in behavior.'
The decline in the number of psychosurgical operations may also be traced
to a growing uneasiness about the sufficiency of medical knowledge of the
brain. Recent approaches to psychosurgery have focused on the limbic system,
which is a part of the cerebrum adjacent to and connecting with the brain
stem.1 Some leading proponents of psychosurgery for behavioral control contend that violent behavior is initiated in the brain stem but that the limbic
system contains the mechanisms for controlling violence. 6 Nevertheless, knowledge about the functions of the limbic system is considered inadequate, and
even advocates of psychosurgery admit there is a disturbing inconsistency in
the findings of the many researchers studying operations on the amygdala, a
1
structure in the limbic system.

11. Breggin & Greenberg, Return of the Lobotomy, The Washington Post, March 12,
1972, §C at 1, col. 1; Holden, supra note 9, at 1109.
12. Scoville, supra note 7, at 453; see The Lobotomists Are Coming Again, Med. World
News, Jan. 15, 1971, at 34.
13. See Breggin & Greenberg, supra note 11; Neurosurgeon Takes Route V-90 to Lobotomy, Med. World News, Jan. 24, 1968, at H3.
14. Reportedly, 400 to 600 such operations continued to be performed annually in the
United States. Breggin, supra note 5, at E1605; Freese, supra note 4, at 12; cf. Holden, supra
note 9, at 1109 (no more than 500). Psychosurgery has also been reported in at least 15
other countries. Breggin, supra note 5, at E1603. The U.S.S.R. reportedly outlawed lobotomy
and psychosurgery in 1951. Id.
15. V. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE AND THE BRAIN 21 (1970). The parts of the limbic
system most frequently subjected to such surgery are the amygdala, the thalamus, and the
cingulate region. Recent attention has focused on amygdalotomies as a means of altering
violent behavior and emotions. The amygdala apparently plays an important role in associating visceral emotional reactions and self-defense mechanisms, such as the "fight or
flight" instinct. See R. ADAMS & R. SIDMAN, INTRODUCTION TO NEUROPATHOLOGY 489-90 (1968);
A. BRODAL, NEUROLOGICAL ANATOMY 535-36 (2d ed. 1969); C. SMITH, THE BRAIN 239, 257
(1970).
16. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 15, at 14-16.
17. Sweet, Ervin & Mark, The Relationship of Violent Behavior to Focal CerebralDisease,
in AGGREssIvE BEHAVIOR 336, 346 (S. Garratine & E. Sigg eds. 1969). See note 15 supra. One
reason suggested for the discrepancies in the reported studies is that the amygdala comprises
several clusters of nuclei, the location of which are not satisfactorily known and which have
differing and even antagonistic functions. Many of these functions are not well understood.
Mark, Sweet & Ervin, The Effect of Amygdalotomy on Violent Behavior in Patients with
Temporal Lobe Epilepsy, in PSYCHOSURGERY: SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 139, 153
(Hitchcock ed. 1972). One criticism of attempts to ameliorate a certain symptom by destroying the related part of the brain is that too often other functions of that part of the brain
are affected. In addition, different psychosurgeons often operate on the same portion of the
brain to eliminate completely different symptoms. See Breggin, supra note 5, at E1603. Some
authorities even suggest that the area of the operation is somewhat insignificant because the
effect achieved is usually the same regardless of the portion of the brain treated. Scoville,
supra note 7, at 456.
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The latest techniques of psychosurgery have not escaped criticism. More
specialized forms of surgery and operations on different parts of the brain
were developed to further localize the destruction of brain tissue. Today the
majority of psychosurgical operations are performed using a method known as
"stereotactic surgery," in which electrodes are inserted in the brain and used to
destroy tissue.'5 Stereotactic destruction of part of the amygdala in patients
with histories of epilepsy and various behavioral problems has been reported
with varying degrees of success.19 Other psychosurgeons have used the sterotactic method on parts of the thalamus region to control assaultive behavior
in brain-damaged children 0 and to relieve severe pain.2' Some practitioners
argue, however, that the damage caused by implanted electrodes cannot be
sufficiently localized,2 2 and there is also some question about the amount of
damage caused by the insertion of the electrodes. The response to these criticisms is that this procedure, in combination with electroencephalography, has

18. The electrodes are used to detect naturally occurring electrical signals in the brain
and also to induce such signals artifically. By correlating natural signals with simultaneous
conduct, or induced signals with resulting conduct, one can determine which section of the
brain causes the reaction. The electrodes are then used to destroy a portion of that section.
Mark & Ervin, supra note 15, at 71-85. See generally C. SEM%-JAcoBSoN, DEPTH-ELECTROGRAPHIC
STIMULATION OF THE HUMAN BRI AND BEHAVIOR (1968); Hassler & Dieckmann, Stereotaxic

Treatment of Compulsive and Obsessive Syndromes, 29

CONFINIA NEUROLOGICA

153 (1967)

(Switz.); Knight, Stereotaxic Tractotomy in the Surgical Treatment of Mental Illness, 28
J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 304 (1965); Narabayashi & Uno, Long Range
Results of Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy for BehavioralDisorders, 27 CONFINIA NEUROLOGIGA 168
(1966) (Switz.). Another reported use of the stereotactic technique is to pass minute bits of
radioactive material through hollow probes to destroy tissue in the desired area of the brain.
Gould, supra note 7, at 227. One researcher has used this procedure on approximately 300
patients in the last decade to relieve excessive depression and claims that 70% have been
cured or greatly aided as a result. Id. "As a surgical technique, it [stereotactic surgery] has
three great advantages over lobectomy: it requires much less of an opening in the surfaces
of the brain than lobectomy does; it destroys less than one-tenth as much brain tissue; and
once the electrodes have been inserted in the brain, they can be left without harm to the
patient until the surgeon is sure which brain cells are firing abnormally and causing the
symptoms of seizures and violence." MARK & ERVIN, supra note 15, at 70. See generally Heath,
Pleasure Response of Human Subjects to Direct Stimulation of the Brain, in THE ROLE OF
PLEASURE IN BEHAvIOR 219 (R. Heath ed. 1964); Heath, John & Fontana, The Pleasure Response: Studies in Sterotaxic Technics [sic] in Patients, in COMPUTErrS AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN PSYCHIATRY 178 (N. Kline & E. Laska eds. 1968).
19. See MARK & ERVIN, supra note 15, at 85-86; Heimburger, Whitlock & Kalsbeck,
Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy for Epilepsy with Aggressive Behavior, 198 J.A.M.A. 741 (1966);
Schwab, Sweet, Mark, Kjelberg & Ervin, Treatment of Intractable Temporal Lobe Epilepsy
by Stereotactic Amygdala Lesions, 90 TRANs. Am. NEUROLOGICAL ASS'N 12, 15-16 (1965);
Vaernet & Madsen, Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy and Basofrontal Tractotomy in Psychotics
with Aggressive Behaviour 33, J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 858 (1970).
20. See Sano, Yoshioka, Ogashiwa, Ishijima & Ohye, PosteromedialHypothalamotomy in
the Treatment of Aggressive Behavior, 27 CONFINIA NEUROLOGICA 164-67 (1966) (Switz.).
21. See Mark & Ervin, Relief of Pain by Stereotactic Surgery, in PAIN AND THE NEUROSURGEONS: A FORTY YEAR EXPERtENCE 844-87 (J. White & V. Sweet eds. 1969); Mark, Ervin &
Hackett, Clinical Aspects of Stereotactic Thalamotomy in the Human: The Treatment of
ChronicSevere Pain (pt. 1), 3 ARCHIvES OF NEUROLOGY 351-67 (1960).
22. See Winter, supra note 7, at 45.
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not only facilitated improvements in surgical techniques but has also ad23
vanced our knowledge of the brain.
Although psychosurgical technology has improved, the operations still
draw much criticism on the same grounds raised against the earlier form of
psychosurgery.2 4 For example, the lack of control groups is still faulted, and
the favorable results reported by physicians are alleged to be equally attributable to extensive and prolonged postoperative psychiatric treatment and
rehabilitation training.25 Follow-up studies continue to reveal evidence of
severe brain damage and deteriorating mental states. 26 Nevertheless, some
authorities predict a massive resurgence of psychosurgery, which will rival the
27
wave of lobotomies two decades ago.
The legal aspects of psychosurgery can be as complex as the medical ones.
This article discusses the requisites for valid consent in the psychosurgical context. Of primary concern is whether adequate consent can possibly be obtained
from the type of patient normally considered a subject for psychosurgery or
from his legal representative. The recent judicial, legislative, and administrative efforts to protect patients potentially subject to psychosurgery will be
reviewed, with the intention of proposing a general consent standard adapted
to the unique nature of psychosurgical operations.
CONSENT TO SURGERY
Specific consent to an operation upon one's body is a requirement adopted

by American courts from the common law. Absent unanticipated conditions
or an emergency, the physician or hospital must obtain the consent of the
patient or, if he is not competent to give it, of someone legally authorized to
give it for him before any treatment or operation is undertaken. 2S This gen-

23. See Heath, Depth Recording and Stimulation in Patients, in THE SURGICAL CONTROL
OF BEHAVIOR 21, 25-30 (A. Winter ed. 1971).
24. See note 7 supra.
25. Breggin, supra note 5, at E1608.
26. See Dynes, Lobotomy -Twenty Years After, 95 VA. MEDICAL MONTHLY 306 (1968);
Miller, The Lobotomy Patient -A Decade Later, 96 CAN. MEDICAL ASS'N J. 1095 (1967);
Moser, A Ten-Year Followup of Lobotomy Patients, 20 HOsprrAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY
381 (1969).
27. Breggin, supra note 5, at E1602.
28. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780, 788-89 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 366-67, 228 N.W. 681, 682 (1930);
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 268-69, 104 N.W. 12, 14-15 (1905). A surgical operation
performed without the consent of either the patient or some authorized person constitutes a
technical battery. See, e.g., Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1943); Pratt v. Davis,
224 Ill. 300, 305-06, 79 N.E. 562, 564 (1906); Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 366, 228
N.W. 681, 682 (1930); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 271, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (1905); Rolater
v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 576, 137 P. 96, 98 (1913); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 695, 697-99 (1957). See
also J. KATz, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 523 (1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 628 (1969); Comment, Consent to Surgery A Dilemma, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 591 (1973); Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal
Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). Actions alleging
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eral rule suggests three questions that should be answered in analyzing the
problem of consent in a psychosurgical context: (1) whether a patient is himself competent to consent when he allegedly has some neurological or psychological defect necessitating the treatment, (2) whether a third party may consent for an incompetent patient if the potential risks of the surgery outweigh
the probable and possible benefits to the subject, and (3) whether the numerous unknowns inherent in psychosurgery prevent the physician from adequately informing and advising the patient or his representative as informed
consent requires. Because of the dearth of case law dealing directly with
psychosurgery, this analysis must depend largely on analogous medical consent
cases.
Competency2 9 of the Patient To Consent
Problems arise where the patient supposedly gives consent to surgery while
suffering from a mental condition or while under the influence of sedatives or
other drugs. The established rule is that mental incompetents lack the capacity
to consent to medical treatment 0 and, if the patient is clearly incompetent,
the consent of a guardian is necessary.3 ' The law presumes competency rather
than incompetency,32 including competency to consent to medical treatment.3 3
Thus, the initial presumption is that the patient's own consent is sufficient.
This presumption appears to stand even where the treatment is dearly for a
lack of informed consent will sound not only in battery, but also in negligence on the
theory that the duty to inform and obtain valid consent is an integral part of the treatment
rendered. See, e.g., Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d 125, 130 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). Several commentators discuss factors affecting the plaintiff's choice of cause of action or suggest narrowing the possibility of suing on a battery theory. See generally McCoid, A Reappraisal of
Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. Rnv. 381, 382-86, 422-34 (1957);
Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1399 & n.18
(1967); Note, Failure To Inform as Medical Malpractice,23 VAND. L. REv. 754 (1970); Note,
79 YALE L.J., supra at 1555 n.64, 1557 n.67 (1970).
29. The term "competency" as used here refers to the patient's actual mental ability to
agree to the operation as contrasted with the absence of any legal disability, such as minority,
coverture, or the like.
30. See Farber v. Olkon, 246 P.2d 710, 713-14 (2d Dist. 1952), aff'd, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254
P.2d 520 (1953) (en banc); Moore v. Webb, 345 S.W.2d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961)
(narcotizing drug); cf. Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 305-06, 79 N.E. 562, 564 (1906). Mental
competency necessary to consent to an operation should be similar to the competency required to stand trial or manage property. See Tim MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 303-14,
408-21 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971). Thus, the patient should be able to comprehend the
nature of the operation and the risks involved and also to understand both his needs and
rights with regard to the grant or denial of consent.
81. See Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 305-07, 79 N.E. 562, 564 (1906).
32. See, e.g., Walton v. Malcolm, 264 IM. 389, 396, 106 N.E. 211, 214 (1914) (competency
to deed land); Belger v. Arnot, 344 Mass. 679, 686, 183 N.E.2d 866, 870 (1962) (competency
to consent to medical treatment); Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash. 2d 804, 307, 422 P.2d 812,
814 (1967) (competency to consent to operation). See generally 41 Am. JUm. 2D Incompetent
Persons §129 (1968).
33. Belger v. Arnot, 344 Mass. 679, 686, 183 N.E.2d 866, 870 (1962); Grannum v. Berard,
70 Wash. 2d 304, 307, 422 P.2d 812, 814 (1967). See also Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1439, 1440-42
(1969).
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mental condition.3 4 Thus, the doctor still has a duty to inform the patient of
the major risks involved in a proposed treatment of a mental problem in order
to obtain his informed consent.3 5 An exception may exist, however, where the
patient's condition might be worsened should he have to consider the possible
hazards.3 6
Third Party Consent Based on Balancing of Risks and Benefits
When an incompetent's incapacity precludes valid consent on his part,
courts have often required the consent of a third party. In testing the validity
of this consent, courts have generally utilized an objective standard that
balances the risks of the treatment against the possible benefits to the patient
or society.
In one much discussed organ transplant case, for example, the court accepted parental consent to a retarded son's donation of one kidney to his only
brother, since the retarded son would suffer emotional and psychological
damage if his brother died.3 - The court in effect adopted an objective standard
of substituted judgment and concluded that the retarded brother would have
consented had he been mentally competent.38 Thus, the court avoided problems raised concerning parental consent in such a context.
Third-party consent is not a desirable alternative unless it is measured
against some objective criterion. For example, parental consent may be viewed
with a certain amount of skepticism. Parents often have quite ambivalent
feelings toward their unfortunate offspring; and these feelings may color their
decision, particularly where another family member is to be the donee of a
transplanted organ. 39 Parental consent raises similar dilemmas in psycho-

34. Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 1489, 1440-42 (1969); see Wilson v. Lehman, 379 S.W.2d 478,
479 (Ky. 1964). In Wilson the patient's own consent to electroshock treatment for a mental
condition was held valid, since there was no evidence indicating lack of consent. In fact, some
evidence indicated that the condition did not interfere with her capacity to make intelligent
decisions. Id. at 479-80.
35. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11, 19 (Mo. 1960).
36. See Lester v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 923 (1957). This case held that where the patient had given general consent to treatment, where both the physician and the patient's wife believed his condition made it unsafe for him to consider certain unlikely hazards of electroshock treatment, and where the
wife gave informed consent, the patient was not denied his power to contract, and thus his
liberty, without due process of law.
37. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148-49 (Ky. 1969); see Note, TransplantationIncompetent Donors: Was the First Step or the Last Taken in Strunk v. Strunk?, 58 CAiF. L.
Rxv. 754, 771 (1970); Comment, The Power of the Committee To Permit Donation of the
Ward's Kidney: The Relationship of the Ward, Committee, and Court Examined, 19 AM.
U.L. REv. 495 (1970). The mother was the committee appointed at law to serve as a
guardian for the incompetent brother. 445 SAV.2d at 145.
38. Id. at 148.
39. See id. at 150 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 37, at 766-67. "This
ambivalence, in conjunction with the fact that transplantations involving blood relations
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surgical operations, as many of the same motivational factors are present.
Embarrassment over the patient's violent acts or aberrant behavior and the
expense and possible humiliation of lengthy institutionalization may well
affect the family's decision to consent.
Likewise, the alternative of substituting the consent of institutional authorities for that of the parent or guardian may not solve the problem. Institutional officials have an interest in the manageability of a patient that precludes
objective judgment. Given the alternatives, a mental incompetent's family is
40
still probably the best party to protect his interests.
One suggested approach to an objective measurement of third-party consent examines the benefit to society to result from a particular operation.
Critics of this rationale, however, raise the spectre of a decision that sacrifices
the rights of an incompetent donor to the needs of a "productive" citizen of
society.," The apparent solution to criticisms of familial or institutional consent and the social welfare rationale is to make the test one of benefit to the
patient himself. This test would produce truly substituted judgment of the
patient rather than relying on vague determinations of what is good for the
common weal or upon the judgment of a possibly biased third party. Psychiatrists and physicians would have to be consulted to ascertain whether the
42
treatment would benefit the patient.
The application of this patient-oriented objective standard has been extensive in other contexts, and denials of consent by the responsible third party
have caused courts to look to the objective standard as an independent source
of consent rather than as merely a yardstick against which to test the third
party's consent. Thus, while surgery on minors normally requires parental
consent, 43 courts have used the benefit analysis to circumvent parental denials
of consent, as in those cases where parents oppose blood transfusions for their
children on religious grounds.44 By using the benefit test to justify constructive

are more likely to succeed, has led one specialist in kidney transplantation to warn against
the 'possibility of intrafamilial pressure, which in its most malignant form might be directed
towards a specific family member on the basis of his or her expendability."' Id. at 766,
citing Starzl, Discussion, in LAW AND ETHcs OF TRANSPLANTATION 54, 66 (G. Wolstenholme

& M. O'Connor eds. 1968).
40. See Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress, 82 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 563,

593-94 (1967).
41. See Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 151 (Steinfeld, J., dissenting); Note, supra note

37, at 771-75.
42. But see Note, supra note 87, at 774-75 (courts should adhere to the consent require-

ment precluding donation by mental incompetents).
48. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1941); see Morse, Legal Implications
of Clinical Investigation, 8 Wms. 8&MARY L. REv. 359, 867-69 (1967); Ratnoff & Smith, Human
Laboratory Animals: Martyrs for Medicine, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 673, 685-86 (1968).
44. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 625-26, 104 N.E.2d 769, 773-74, cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 824 (1952); State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 474, 477, 181 A.2d 751, 757, 759,
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890 (1962); ef. Application of President and Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., 31 F.2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (transfusion
for wife in extremis over husband's objection, to preserve controversy without determining
ultimate merits). In less extreme cases, however, courts have refused to substitute their judg-
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consent, the courts have generally, but not always, 45 ordered the necessary
operation on the basis of an overriding concern for the welfare of the minor.
While the experimental nature of psychosurgery prevents it from being considered a necessary operation, the time may come when it is an accepted
medical treatment for certain conditions and the benefit analysis already used
to imply the consent of minors may be extended to imply the consent of incompetent psychosurgery patients. Thus, a court might permit implied consent
where the benefits to the mentally incompetent patient clearly outweigh the
risks of psychosurgery.
Requirement of Informed Consent
Rather than focusing on the benefit to the patient, the traditional analysis
of consent has concentrated on whether consent was "informed." Informed
consent exists if the patient is adequately apprised of the risks, consequences,
and prognosis of the proposed treatment prior to the operation, so that consent
could have been rational and deliberate.
Consent to an operation is ineffective if the patient does not know of the
dangers inherent in the procedure. 4 6 Informed consent, then, covers not only
the decisionmaking process on the part of the patient but also the duty of the
physician to disclose any information necessary for the patient to make a
47
reasoned decision.
The physician's duty to disclose is limited, however, to those revelations
that a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school would make under
the same or similar circumstances. 48 A physician is under no duty to warn his
patient of the negative prospects of proposed treatment if the doctor has reason
to believe that the health of the patient will be adversely affected by disclosure

ment for that of the parent. See In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561, 563 (Philadelphia
County C.P. No. 2, 1912) (rickets).
45. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561, 563 (Philadelphia County C.P. No. 2, 1912).
46. See Bowers v. Talmadge, 159 So. 2d 888, 889 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); Woods v.
Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 227, 377 P.2d 520, 524 (1962).
47. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Ist Dist. 1957); Bowers v. Talmadge, 159 So. 2d 888, 889 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1963); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Texas 1967). See generally Plante, An
Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAM L .REv. 639 (1968); Waltz & Scheuneman, supra
note 28, at 630-43.
48. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 409-11, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 (1960);
Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 140, 119 N.W.2d 627, 630 (1963); Aiken v. Clary, 396
S.W.2d 668, 675 (Mo. 1965). See generally Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 28, at 636. One
commentator has questioned whether a community custom or standard for disclosure really
can exist, since the patient's character is a prime consideration in the physician's decision,
and each patient is mentally and emotionally unique. See Comment, supra note 28, at 1404.
The latter commentator suggests that the standard for physicians should be disclosure of all
known and material risks except those that the patient is likely to know already (materiality
to be measured by the severity and frequency of the risk). The physician would have the
burden of proving the reasonableness of any lesser disclosure or the immateriality of the
undisclosed risk. Id. at 1407.
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of such information. 49 At the minimum, however, the more prominent features
and risks of the proposed treatment should be made known to the patient so
that he can decide whether to proceed. 50
Informed Consent to ExperimentalSurgery
In the context of experimental medical treatments,5 1 the requirement of
informed consent protects the individual's right to decide questions affecting

his life, causes the experimenter to review the adequacy of the safeguards used
in his procedures, and increases public awareness of human research. 52 Informed consent also protects the experimenter from civil and criminal liability, although liability can result despite proper consent if the experimental
procedures are not reasonable medical practices in light of the physician's

53
knowledge of the risks.
The rule originally applied in experimentation cases was that a surgeon

who departed from accepted procedures did so at his own peril should injury
result.5 4 The judiciary has since become more sympathetic toward experiments
that do not vary radically from accepted practices because it recognizes that

experimentation is necessary for medical progress."5 Nevertheless, the experi-

menter must still disclose to the patient all potential risks that would be disclosed by other reasonable practitioners in the same specialty. 56 It has been

49._See, e.g., Lester v. Aetna Gas. &cSur. Co., 240 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 923 (1957); Roberts v. Wood, 206 F. Supp. 579, 583 (S.D. Ala. 1962); Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668, 674 (Mo. 1965); Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299, 301-02 (Texas 1967).
50. It has been suggested that the physician must disclose any danger in the procedure,
knowledge of which would influence the patient's decision to consent to the treatment. See
Waltz &cScheuneman, supra note 28, at 638-41. An important factor in deciding whether a
collateral danger must be disclosed is the probability that the danger will materialize. The
greater the frequency of injury from the procedure, the greater the obligation of the physician
to explain it to the patient. See Plante, supranote 47, at 655.
51. An experimental procedure was defined by a witness in Kaimowitz as "one that is
performed in only a few medical centers; in which the risks of the procedure are not well
understood, and the patient population to whom such procedure should be done is not well
defined." Brief for the American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 14, Kaimowitz
v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County,
Mich., July 10, 1973).
52. See J. KATz, supra note 28, at 523. See generally Symposium: Some Legal Problems in
Medical Treatment and Research, 36 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 631 (1969).
53. See Waltz ScScheuneman, supra note 28, at 634-35.
54. Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1871), rev'd on other grounds,
50 N.Y. 696 (1872); see Kershaw v. Tilbury, 214 Cal. 679, 688-91, 8 P.2d 109, 113 (1932);
Graham v. Doctor Pratt Institute, 163 Ill. App. 91, 93 (1911).
55. See Fortner v. Koch, 272 Mich. 273, 282, 261 N.W. 762, 765 (1935).
56. See note 50 supra. Some commentators have suggested that a physician has a duty
to disclose a risk if it is known by other physicians practicing under like circumstances or
could have been discovered by the treating physician through reasonable investigation, although it was unknown to others. Waltz &cScheuneman, supra note 28, at 631-35. On the
other hand, the duty to inform in an experimental context is criticized on the ground that
there would be no need to conduct the investigation if the researcher were already able to

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss3/2

10

Spoonhour: Psychosurgery and Informed Consent
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

suggested that a more stringent informed consent requirement should be applied where the operation is experimental, dangerous, and intrusive because
57
of the greater likelihood of serious harm to the subject.

Experiments utilizing innovative treatment usually involve either patients
needing a particular treatment to cure an existing ailment or subjects serving
as guinea pigs so that more can be learned about the treatment itself.5 8 Both
situations present serious consent questions. In the first case, the patient probably is seeking the experimental treatment as a last resort following the failure
of conventional methods and is therefore more susceptible to suggestion. 59 In
the latter instance, the lack of benefit to the patient should possibly preclude
the treatment. 60
Several medical organizations have issued guidelines designed to protect
experimenters from legal liability. In 1957 the American Medical Association
advised that human experimentation should not be undertaken except "(1)
with the voluntary informed consent of the person on whom the experiment
is to be performed; (2) after the danger of the experiment has been investigated previously by animal experimentation; and (3) under proper medical
protection and management." 61 Similarly, in 1964 the World Medical Association announced recommendations to guide doctors in clinical research. It distinguished research aimed at therapeutic treatment of a patient from research
focused primarily upon advancing scientific knowledge. One of the basic principles set forth was that the experiment should not be performed unless the
importance of the research outweighed the inherent risk to the subject.62

inform the participant accurately of all probable results and risks. See Ritts, A Physician's
View of Informed Consent in Human Experimentation, 31 Foa, DnAm L. REv. 631, 631-32
(1968).
57. Brief for the American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 51-54, Kaimowitz
v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County,
Mich., July 10, 1973). But see Beecher, Some Fallacies and Errors in the Application of the
Principle of Consent in Human Experimentation, 3 CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUICS 141
(1962).
58. See Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 43, at 676.
59. See generally Breggin, Coercion of Voluntary Patients in an Open Mental Hospital,
10 ARCHIVES GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 173 (1964).
60. See Morse, Legal Implications of Clinical Investigation, 20 VAND. L. REv. 747, 747-49
(1967); Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 43, at 676-77. The imposition of experimental medical
treatment upon prisoners and mental patients has raised serious constitutional questions. See
Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973). Prisoners have been used as medical
guinea pigs at least since World War II. See, e.g., Beecher, Experimentation in Man, 169
J.A.M.A. 461, 465 (1959); Hodges & Beach, The Use of Prisoners for Medical Research, 202
J.A.M.A. 513 (1967); Comment, Human Experimentation: Cancer Studies at Sloan-Kettering
Stir Public Debate on Medical Ethics, 143 SCIENCE 551 (1964).
61. AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1957) (pamphlet), quoted in Ratnoff & Smith,
supra note 43, at 679.
62. WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI (1964), quoted in Ratnoff &
Smith, supra note 43, at 680-81. A very influential code of medical ethics was developed by
the Nuremberg Military Tribunals in 1947. See United States v. Brandt (the medical case),
quoted in Ladimer, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Medical Research on Human Beings, 3
J. PuB. L. 467, 487-89 (1954).
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Informed Consent to Psychosurgery
No case dealt directly with the consent issue in the context of psychosurgery
and the special problems of such operations until Kaimowitz v. Department of
Mental Health.63 Kaimowitz, decided by a Michigan trial court in 1973, involved a mental patient who had been committed to a state hopsital under the
state's criminal sexual psychopath law64 following his arrest for the murder
and rape of a nurse at the mental institution where he had previously been
treated. The patient, Louis Smith, had been institutionalized since 1955, and
his behavior had been notably free of violence or other inappropriate aggression for several years. In fact, the testimony revealed that he would have been
considered for release within six months to a year and that he probably was
treatable by more conventional forms of therapy.65 Instead, Smith was given
an opportunity in 1972 to become a subject in a project studying the effect of
psychosurgery on aggressive tendencies. 6 Both Smith and his parents consented
to the psychosurgical operation. 67 Smith's candidacy was then approved by

63. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
64. Micr. COMp. LAwS ANN. §§780.501-.509 (1968). The statute was repealed in 1968.
Continued detention was based on MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §330.35(b) (Supp. 1973), which
allows further detention or release of criminal sexual psychopaths committed under the repealed statute.
65. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW, at 2-3 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
Brief for the American Orthopsychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Kaimowitz v.
Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, Mich.,
July 10, 1973).
66. Brief for American Orthopsychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 12. In 1970 two
physicians on the staff of the Lafayette Clinic, a facility of the Michigan Department of
Health located in Detroit, proposed this study of surgical treatment of uncontrollable aggression, and the Michigan legislature subsequently funded it. Twenty-four criminal sexual
psychopaths in the state's mental health system were to be subjects of an experiment to
determine whether there is a relationship between abnormal electrical discharges in the brain
and aggressive behavior in patients having physical abnormalities of the brain. See id. at 8,
14. The experimental program ran into trouble almost immediately, however, when a sufficient patient population could not be obtained. In fact, Louis Smith was the only appropriate candidate available within the state mental hospital system. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 5 (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich.,
July 10, 1973).
67. The comment that Smith signed appears below:
"Since conventional treatment efforts over a period of several years have not enabled me
to control my outbursts of rage and anti-social behavior, I submit an application to be a
subject in a research project which may offer me a form of effective therapy. This therapy
is based upon the idea that episodes of anti-social rage and sexuality might be triggered
by a disturbance in certain portions of my brain. I understand that in order to be certain
that a significant brain disturbance exists, which might relate to my anti-social behavior, an
initial operation will have to be performed. This procedure consists of placing fine wires
into my brain, which will record the electical activity from those structures which play a
part in anger and sexuality. These electrical waves can then be studied to determine the
presence of an abnormality.
"In addition electrical stimulation with weak currents passed through these wires will be
done in order to find out if one or several points in the brain can trigger my episodes of
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two committees established to determine the scientific worthiness of the study
in light of the patricular subject selected and to review the validity of the
consent obtained.s Just prior to the operation, however, suit was brought by
a local legal services attorney on behalf of himself, individual members of the
Medical Committee for Human Rights, Smith, and other similarly situated
patients.69
The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment 70 as to whether either an
adult who is involuntarily detained in a state institution or his guardian can
give legally adequate consent to experimental surgical procedures designed to
ameliorate undesirable behavior. 7 1 The court concluded that valid consent to
experimental psychosurgical procedures could not be given under these cir72

cumstances.

violence or unlawful sexuality. In other words this stimulation may cause me to want to
commit an aggressive or sexual act, but every effort will be made to have a sufficient number
of people present to control me. If the brain distrubance is limited to a small area, I understand that the investigators will destroy this part of my brain with an electrical current. If
the abnormality comes from a larger part of my brain, I agree that it should be surgically
removed, if the doctors determine that it can be done so, without risk of side effects. Should
the electrical activity from the parts of my brain into which the wires have been placed
reveal that there is no significant abnormality, the wires will simply be withdrawn.
"I realize that any operation on the brain carries a number of risks which may be slight,
but could be potentially serious. These risks include infection, bleeding, temporary or
permanent weakness or paralysis of one or more of my legs or arms, difficulties with speech
and thinking, as well as the ability to feel, touch, pain and temperature. Under extraordinary
circumstances, it is also possible that I might not survive the operation.
"Fully aware of the risks detailed in the paragraphs above, I authorize the physicians of
Lafayette Clinic and Providence Hospital to perform the procedures as outline above."
October 27, 1972
Date
Calvin Vance
Witness

/S/ Louis M. Smith
Signature
/S/ Emily T. Smith/Harry L. Smith
Signature of reasonable relative or guardian

68. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 3 n.5, 5
(Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
69. Because of the publicity surrounding the filing of the suit, funding for the project
was terminated by the Michigan Department of Health. Id. at 5. The discontinuance of the
program raised the possibility that the case had become moot. After full argument on this
issue, the court ruled that the matter should be heard because "even though the original
experimental program was terminated, there was nothing that would prevent it from being
instituted again in the near future, and therefore the matter was ripe for declaratory judgment." Id. at 7.
70. A habeas corpus petition was also filed, and on March 23, 1973, the court held that
Smith's detention was unconstitutional. The court subsequently directed Smith's release on
the basis of testimony that he could be returned to society safely. Id. at 6 & n.7.
71. If that question were answered in the affirmative, the plaintiffs sought a ruling on
the constitutionality of undertaking experimental neurosurgical procedures on such a subject.
The court did not reach this issue. Id. at 8-9.
72. Id. at 31-32, 40. Although the court's ruling with regard to consent was clearly
dispositive of the issues presented, it also discussed the constitutional considerations that
preclude experimental psychosurgical operations in this context. The court believed that a
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In analyzing the consent question, the court recognized that there might be
a connection between violence and brain disease that could be the subject of

proper medical experimentation.73 Furthermore, the court specifically excluded
more established neurosurgical techniques, such as temporal lobectomies for
relief of epilepsy or the removal of tumors, from its consideration.7 4 Consequently, the Kaimowitz decision dealt only with the narrow question of valid

consent to experimental psychosurgery by an involuntarily confined patient.75
The court initially approached the problem on the basis of benefit to the
patient,76 suggesting that a "risk-benefit ratio" be imposed in all instances of

proposed experimental surgery 7 and concluding that the risk must be considerably less than the benefit in order to justify human experimentation in a
nonlifesaving situation.78 In comparing the risks and benefits to Louis Smith,
the court found several factors particularly influential. First, although testimony indicated a low incidence of mortality from similar operations, all of

the experts questioned agreed that serious unknown dangers were involved7 o
person's mental ability to generate ideas fell within the protection of the first amendment
because the right to communicate ideas would be otherwise meaningless. Since state action
was involved in both the confinement of the proposed subjects and the sponsoring of the
psychosurgery experimentation, the program would be constitutional only if the state could
demonstrate a compelling state interest. No such showing was made in this case. Id. at 32-36.
The court also argued that surgery of this nature and in this context would be an invasion
of the patient's right of privacy. Id. at 36-39. "Intrusion into one's intellect, when one is involuntarily detained and subject to the control of institutional authorities, is an intrusion
into one's constitutionally protected right of privacy. If one is not protected in his thoughts,
behavior, personality, and identity, then the right of privacy becomes meaningless." Id at 38,
citing Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used To "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Deinolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 616, 661-65 (1972). Again, the
Kaimowitz court found no compelling state interest that outweighed the right of privacy.
Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 39 (Cir. Ct.,
Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973). See generally Note, The Rights of the Mentally Ill
During Incarceration: The Developing Law, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 494 (1973); Commentary,
Pregnancy, Privacy, and the Constitution: The Court at the Crossroads, 25 U. FLA. L. REv.
779 (1973).
73. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 15 (Cir.
Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
74. Id. at 10, 40.
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id. at 12-18. One commentator has noted that the benefits may lie in the furtherance
of science, rather than in any direct benefit to the subject. If this is the case, the subject
should be told that he will not be benefited directly, with the possible exception of altruistic
satisfaction. See Ritts, supra note 56, at 634. In Kaimowitz the court found no "persuasive
showing" that the proposed psychosurgery would "significantly increase the body of scientific
knowledge by providing answers to problems of deviant behavior." Civ. Action No. 7819434-AWV at 16.
77. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 22.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 16. In addition to the usual dangers associated with any serious operation,
psychosurgery can result in an impairment of memory, an inability to reason abstractly, a
general apathy, or a heightened rage reaction. Id. at 17; see Brief for the American Orthopsychiatric Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 32-39, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health,
Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW (Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973). Moreover, the
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Second, no medically recognized syndrome related to aggressive or other objectionable behavior had been connected with the types of brain abnormalities
sought to be treated in Smith's case. 0 Finally, the expert witnesses agreed that
psychosurgery does not guarantee that a dangerously violent person can be
restored to the community.81 Thus, the court found no scientific support for
the contention that destruction or removal of part of the limbic system would
have a direct therapeutic effect on the patient by controlling his aggressive
tendencies.8 2 In conclusion, therefore, the operation on Smith was viewed unfavorably because the benefits to the subject were uncertain, while the dangers
were significant; 3 and the court ruled that no psychosurgery could be under84
taken.
In addition to using a risk-benefit ratio to determine the propriety of
psychosurgery, the Kaimowitz court discussed the more traditional considerations of valid consent. Examining the competency of an involuntarily detained
mental patient to consent to psychosurgery, it declared: "Competency requires
the ability of the subject to understand rationally the nature of the procedure,
its risks, and other relevant information."8 Although an involuntarily detained mental patient might have sufficient intelligence to comprehend the
situation presented to him,3 his capacity to consent to psychosurgery is diminished by his mental problem, his confinement, and the effect of "institutionalization."'s The competency of Louis Smith to consent to psychosurgery was
questionable, since he had lived for more than seventeen years in mental
hospitals without making any major decisions."8 A second element of informed

operation proposed was an amygdalotomy, a cutting of the fibers of the amygdala located
within the limbic system of the brain. The court emphasized how limited the state of
knowledge is concerning the function of this system and its connection with behavior. Civ.
Action No. 73-19434-AW at 11-12. This conclusion is borne out by the writings of some of
the best known researchers in the field. See Mark, Sweet & Ervin, The Effect of Amygdalotomy
on Violent Behavior in Patients with Temporal Lobe Epilepsy, in PSYCHOSURGERY: SECOND
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 139, 153 (Hitchcock ed. 1972).
80. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 15-17.
81. Id. at 17. Several of the medical experts emphasized that much of the difficulty in
ascertaining the risks and benefits of psychosurgery is due to the failure of the professional
literature to provide sufficient preoperative and postoperative information regarding the
subjects. Id. at 17 n.17.
82. Id. at 17-18.
83. ld. at 16.
84. Id. at 13.
85. Id. at 25.
86. Id. The project involved in Kaimowitz would accept only subjects with an I.Q. of
80 or higher.
87. Id. Institutionalization undermines a patient's capacity to make decisions because
most decisions are made for him. Id. at 26. It has been suggested that institutionalized
patients should be used for experiments only when (1) the procedure is related to the condition that caused the subject to be institutionalized, (2) a disinterested panel of physicians
approves the methodology of the experiment, (3) the procedures conform to the established
principles of medical ethics, and (4) the legal guardian gives an informed permission. See
Ritts, supra note 56, at 637-38.
88. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 26-27.
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consent is knowledge of the risks involved and the procedures to be undertaken. Since the dangers surrounding the psychosurgical procedures proposed
in Kaimowitz were uncertain, the patient could not have made a knowledgeable consent to the operation. 9
The court also discussed the voluntariness of the consent, which often overlaps with capacity to consent. The fact that the proposed subjects in the experimental study would always have a long history of confinement played an
important role in the court's consideration. The difficulty of obtaining a
truly informed consent is compounded by the patient's imprisonment or confinement to a mental facility because of subtle institutional pressures to consent. 90 Relying on standards enunciated by the Nuremberg Code91 requiring
that subjects of experimentation be able to exercise free choice without deceit,
duress, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion, the court stated: "It is
impossible for an involuntarily detained mental patient to be free of ulterior
forms of restraint or coercion when his very release from the institution may
depend upon his cooperating with the institutional authorities and giving
consent to experimental surgery."9 2 The court concluded that the inherently
coercive atmosphere in which an involuntarily detained mental patient lives
93
precludes voluntary consent.
Of course, to a certain extent all laymen are at a psychological disadvantage
when dealing with a physician. The defendants had argued that truly informed consent can never be obtained in the treatment of any serious illness
because patients nearly always assent to doctors' decisions. 94 In the defendant's
view, the "process of obtaining 'informed consent' . . . is no more than an
elaborate ritual, a device that, when the subject is uneducated and uncomprehending, confers no more than the semblace [sic] of propriety on human experimentation. The subject's only real protection

. ..

depends on the con-

89. Id.
90. Id. at 29. See generally Fletcher, Human Experimentation:Ethics in a Consent Situation, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 620, 635-36 (1967).
91. This "code" was based on the trial of the Nazi war criminals before the Nuremberg
Military Tribunals. See United States v. Brandt (the medical case), as quoted in Ladimer,
supra note 62, at 487-89.
92. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 27. See Ratnoff & Smith, supra note 43, at 693-94
(1968). The Kaimowitz court was deeply concerned with two aspects of institutionalization
that contribute to a coercive environment. The all-inclusive control that the institutional
authorities have over the patient's everyday privileges and decisions and the patient's belief
that the institutional authorities completely control his future release and freedom combine
to make the patient both dependent upon the institutional authorities and overly willing to
comply with their wishes.
93. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 28. "Involuntarily confined mental patients live in
an inherently coercive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological coercion
has profound effect upon the patient population. Involuntarily confined patients cannot
reason as equals with the doctors and administrators over whether they should undergo
psychosurgery. They are not able to voluntarily give informed consent because of the inherent inequality in their position." Id. at 29.
94. Id. at 20.
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science and compassion of the investigator and his peers." 95 To the court, the
proposition that truly valid consent could not be obtained from noninstitutionalized patients was further evidence of the impossibility of obtaining valid
consent from those who are involuntarily confined. 96
The court reached its conclusion because certain basic elements of consent
- competency, knowledge, and voluntariness - could not be demonstrated with
the degree of reliability necessary to justify the use of such intrusive procedures. 97 The court also emphasized that when proposed surgery is clearly
experimental, dangerous, and intrusive the risk-benefit ratio must be scrutinized carefully. 98 At times the state has a duty to limit an individual's right to
consent to certain medical procedures. 9 To determine whether the right to
consent is limited, a court first must consider whether the risk-benefit ratio is
reasonable; if it is, the court then should proceed to the more traditional elements of consent, namely, whether it was competent, voluntary, and informed. 00
In its conclusion the court did concede that valid consent to a psychosurgical operation by an involuntarily detained mental patient might be possible
if the state of medical knowledge develops to the extent that the proposed
procedure has become an accepted neurosurgical procedure, is no longer considered experimental, and is accompanied by appropriate review mechanisms. 101 Under such circumstances the patient could make a reasoned and informed consent based upon his own judgment of the potential benefits.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL AcTivITy IN THE AREA OF PSYCHOSURGERY

While the federal government has not yet taken direct action with regard
to regulating psychosurgery, some related activity has occurred in Congress
and the executive branch. Congress has considered cutting off funds for such
projects and has held hearings on experimentation involving humans, while
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) has proposed
protective guidelines for federally funded research projects involving human
subjects.

95.

Id. at 20-21, quoting Ingelfinger, Informed (But Uneducated) Consent, 287 NEW

ENG. J. MEDICINE 465, 466 (1972).

96. Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 21. The possibility of obtaining consent from the
patient's guardian was considered equally unsatisfactory by the court. While such consent
would be adequate for normal surgical procedures, it would be ineffective in the psychosurgery situation because the parent or guardian cannot do that which the patient himself is
legally incapable of doing. Id. at 26.
97. Id. at 81-32.
98. Id. at 22.
99. Id. at 18. See generally Kidd, Limits of the Right of a Person To Consent to Experimentation upon Himself, 117 ScIEN E 211 (1953).
100. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civ. Action No. 73-19434-AW at 22
(Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich., July 10, 1973).
101. Id. at 40.
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CongressionalActivity

In 1973 five measures were introduced in Congress102 that would affect the
use of psychosurgery. Although none of these measures was reported out of
committee,' 03 the potential effect of their provisions upon the future use of
psychosurgery warrants consideration. In addition to imposing a two-year
moratorium on the use of federal funds and facilities for projects involving
psychosurgical procedures, Senate Joint Resolution 86 would require HEW to
conduct a comprehensive study of psychosurgery to determine the number and
type of operations performed during the last five years in both public and
private hospitals in the United States. 04 This study would provide a basis for
objective scientific evaluation of the surgical technique and would include
follow-up data on a selected number of cases.' 0- While the study would be of
considerable value in determining whether psychosurgery can be deemed an
acceptable medical techmique, it is questionable whether a moratorium is necessary or advisable, provided that truly informed consent is properly obtained.
In any event, such a moratorium dearly should not include the accepted forms
of psychosurgery that have been proved beneficial and not unduly risky.
The Senate Subcommittee on Health held extensive hearings on the other
three measures pending before the Senate. 106 One bill proposes mandatory
guidelines for obtaining informed consent in any federally funded research
utilizing human subjects. 0 7 Another creates an independent board within the
executive branch to establish guidelines for federally funded experiments involving humans. 08 A third measure proposes the establishment of a commission to undertake a comprehensive study of the ethical, social, and legal implications of biomedical research.'0 9
The House of Representatives bill would prohibit psychosurgery in all
federally connected health care facilities. 10 Nearly every medical facility in the
country would be affected, since the receipt of federal grants or loans for con-

102.
103.

S. 878, S. 934, SJ. Res. 71, S.J. Res. 86, and H.R. 6852, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Three of the measures, S. 878, S.J. Res. 71, and S.J. Res. 86 were assigned to the

Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee, while S. 934 was committed to the Senate
Government Operations Committee and H.R. 6852 was sent to the House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee.
104. S.J. Res. 86, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see 119 CONG. REc. S 6153-54 (daily ed.

March 29, 1973).
105. Id.
106. Hearings on S. 974, S. 878, & S.J. Res. 71 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1-3 (1973).
107. S. 878, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
108. S. 934, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The functions of the board would include estab-

lishing guidelines for the involvement of human subjects in medical experiments, reviewing
all federally funded experiments to assure compliance wth those guidelines, obtaining injunctions to prevent noncomplying research, providing compensation to victims of noncomplying experiments, and submitting an annual report to Congress. Id. §5.
109. S.J. Res. 71, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §4 (1973).
110. H.R. 6852, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §2 (1973).
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struction programs or to aid in providing services under the Social Security
'
Act would be enough to qualify a facility as "federally connected."111
Again, a
complete ban is not necessarily advisable. Most abuses and questionable practices in the area of psychosurgery could be eliminated by developing and requiring strict adherence to a sound consent procedure.
Action by the Department of Health, Education,and Welfare
The executive branch has also taken action related to psychsurgery. In
September 1973 HEW announced a policy for the protection of human subjects involved in federally funded projects. 11 2 The new regulations would apply to all HEW grants and contracts supporting activities in which "human
subjects may be at risk." 1 3 Responsibility for safeguarding the rights and
welfare of the subjects is placed upon the organization receiving funds."1 Individual researchers no longer can receive grants or contracts for experiments
involving human subjects if there are risks to the patients unless the researchers are affiliated with a qualified organization that assumes responsibility for
the protection of the subjects.1 5 The sponsoring organization can be any
public or private institution or agency, including state and local governments
1 6
and, presumably, hospitals and medical centers.
A review by a committee"l prior to commencement of the study is required
to determine whether the rights and welfare of the subjects involved are adequately protected, whether the risks to an individual are outweighed by the
potential benefits to him or by the importance of the knowledge to be gained,
and whether the informed consent is obtained by adequate and appropriate
methods.",8 The adequacy of the procedures used in obtaining an informed

111.

Id. §l(a)(l).

112. 38 Fed. Reg. 27882 (1973). In addition to the proposed guidelines discussed in the
text, the National Institute of Health, a part of HEW, has appointed a study group to review and recommend policies for the protection of human subjects in biomedical research.
This study group is reportedly considering the development of special procedures for using
mental incompetents or prisoners in biomedical research, compensation of persons injured in
clinical investigations, and a general review of the legal and ethical responsibilities in the
conduct of such research. Id.
113. Id. "Subject at risk" means any individual who may be exposed to the possibility
of physical, pyschological, sociological, or other form of harm as a consequence of participation as a subject in any research, development, or demonstration that extends beyond the

established and accepted forms of treatment necessary to meet his needs. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The sponsoring organization must establish a committee to make both initial and
continuing reviews of the project. This committee must be composed of not fewer than five
persons with varied backgrounds so that its members are professionally competent to review
specific activities and give appropriate counsel. Id. at 27883.
118. Id. at 27882.
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consent 19 must be fully documented. 120 No consent, whether written or oral,
can include any exculpatory language waiving any of the patient's rights or
releasing the institution from liability.1 21 Each recipient of HEW assistance
must provide HEW with written assurances that his organization is complying
with the requirements for initial and continuing committee review and other
1 22
regulations.
The proposed HEW regulations would require that funds be withheld from
projects that have not been reviewed by the organization's committee. 23 In
addition, noncompliance would be grounds for termination or suspension of
the grant or contract.124 The organization or researcher involved in such noncomplying activity may be declared ineligible to receive further HEW contracts or grants until compliance with the guidelines is satisfactorily shown. 125
HEW also would have the authority to disqualify specific researchers without
1 20
terminating the project itself.
CONCLUSION

Consent to general surgery has been analyzed thoroughly by courts and
commentators. Consent to psychosurgery, however, had not been addressed
until recently. During the past year judicial, legislative, and executive scrutiny
of the use of psychosurgical procedures led to serious analysis of the validity of
consent for such operations. Despite these initial developments, the specific
requirements for valid consent to psychosurgery remain unclear. Although the
Kaimowitz decision attempted to specify some requirements, it was limited by
the fact of the patient's involuntary confinement. Legislative action appears
distant at best. The adoption and enforcement of the proposed HEW regulations would satisfy many of the requirements for informed consent. Lacking a
guarantee of effective administrative enforcement, however, the task remains
to combine the doctrines of informed consent, competency, and benefit in a

119. HEW defines "informed consent" as including the following elements:
"(1) A fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purpose, including
identification of any procedures which are experimental; (2) A description of the attendant
discomforts and risks reasonably to be expected; (3)A description of any benefits reasonably
to be expected; (4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advantageous for the subject; (5) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures;
and (6) An instruction that the subject is free to withdraw his consent and to discontinue
participation in the project or activity at any time." Id. In some cases, a patient's premature
withdrawal from an experiment may endanger his life. It has been suggested that in such
instances the question of withdrawal from the program should be made by the attending
physician and a committee of disinterested physicians. This procedure should be explained
to the patient prior to commencement of the experiment. See Ritts, supra note 56, at 635.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

38 Fed. Reg. at 27883.
Id.
Id. at 27882.
Id. at 27885.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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thorough analysis within the context of psychosurgery so that a judicially enforceable standard might be established.
Psychosurgery is indeed serious business. It generally is performed upon
humans rather than upon laboratory animals. Such surgery is often experimental and its effects are irreversible. Consequently, it is reasonable to require
strict adherence to rules for obtaining consent to psychosurgical procedures.
In order to insure that the patient's decision is informed, reasoned, and
voluntary every valid consent should include:
(1) disclosure to the patient and his representative, orally and in writing, of all the risks and discomforts of the procedure that are or should be
known to physicians practicing the same or similar forms of psychosurgery;
(2) presentation to the patient and his representative, orally and in
writing, of a realistic appraisal of the probable benefits the patient will receive as a result of the surgery;
(3) an explanation to the patient and his representative of the surgical
procedures to be used and any reasonable criticisms of them;
(4) fair disclosure to the patient and his representative of the alternative
forms of treatment available;
(5) an objective weighing of the risks and benefits of the operation by a
panel of disinterested physicians and other appropriate lay persons, with
consent being barred if the panel does not approve the treatment;
(6) a demonstration to the satisfaction of a similarly disinterested panel
of neurosurgeons that the proposed surgical technique treats the behavior
sought to be controlled without unnecessary risk of deleterious side effects;
(7) signatures of both the patient and his legal representative on written
consent forms containing a full description of (a) all anticipated risks and
discomforts, (b) the probable benefits, (c) the exact surgical procedure to
be used, and (d) the portion of the brain to be affected;
(8) a requirement that the physician or institution show that the consenting patient's decision was voluntary and not subject to coercion or
pressure, thereby effectively barring consent by an imprisoned person or a
patient institutionalized involuntarily or for a lengthy period;
(9) agreement prior to the operation on the physician's obligations regarding post-operative care, as well as provision for continuing supervision
of follow-up treatment by disinterested parties; and
(10) agreement prior to the operation that either the patient or his
legal representative may terminate his consent and participation at any
time, except that termination may be delayed by decision of both the attending physician and a disinterested panel, if immediate withdrawal
would endanger the patient's life.
Compliance with these requirements for valid consent to psychosurgery apparently satisfies the tests established in analogous areas of the law. The patient
would be fully informed, his decision voluntary and competent, and his consent barred if the surgery was not considered sufficiently beneficial by a disinterested panel.
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